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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Salena Clayton appeals from her conviction for felony injury to children. 
She challenges the no contact order and no contact clause of her probation. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Sixteen-year-old A.R.C. reported that Clayton, her mother, had been 
sexually, emotionally, and physically abusing her for several years. (PSI, pp. 2-3; 
G.J. Tr., p. 18, L. 19- p. 102, L. 5; Police Report pp. 7-8, 10-12 (attached to PSI, 
pagination by stamp at bottom of page).) Police interviewed A.R.C.'s younger 
brother, A.C., age 13, who reported being the victim of similar abuses. (PSI, pp. 
3-4; G.J. Tr., p. 103, L. 3-p. 150, L. 11; Police Report, pp. 12-13, 14-16.) Both 
children reported that Clayton had threatened them with physical harm if they 
reported her. (PSI, pp. 2-3.) A grand jury indicted Clayton on two counts of 
felony injury to children and two counts of intimidating a witness. (R., pp. 23-25.) 
Clayton pied guilty to one count of injury to children. (R., pp. 60-69, 71-
72.) The district court sentenced Clayton to ten years with three years fixed, and 
suspended the sentence and placed Clayton on probation for ten years. (R., pp. 
77-78, 81-85.) The court also ordered no contact with A.R.C., A.C., and a third, 
younger son, A.D. (R., pp. 79, 84.) Clayton filed a notice of appeal timely from 
the district court's judgment. (R., pp. 88-90.) 
While the appeal was pending, Clayton filed two motions to amend the no 
contact order. (Supp. R., pp. 6-7, 11.) After a hearing the district court granted 
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the second motion and amended the no contact order to expire on November 8, 
2020. (Supp. R., pp. 16-18.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Clayton states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is the district court's no contact order facially invalid because 
it has no discernable expiration date? 
2. Does [sic] the district court's no contact order and terms of 
probation both violate Ms. Clayton's fundamental right as a 
parent in relation to her youngest child? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is Clayton's challenge to the no contact order moot? 
2. Has Clayton failed to show any abuse of discretion in the court's no 
contact order? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Clayton's Challenge To The No Contact Order Is Moot 
Clayton argues on appeal that the district court committed fundamental, 
constitutional error by failing to follow Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2's requirement that 
a no contact order have an expiration date. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-10.) Since 
the filing of her brief the district court has amended the no contact order to expire 
on November 8, 2020, coinciding with the scheduled expiration of her probation. 
(Supp. R., pp. 16-18; see also R., pp. 81-82.) The amendment has rendered this 
issue moot. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (issue 
moot if no judicial relief can be granted). 
11. 
Clayton Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion In The Court's No Contact 
Order 
A. Introduction 
The district court ordered, in a no contact order and as a condition of 
probation, that Clayton have no contact with her three children. (R., pp. 79, 84; 
Supp. R., pp. 16-18.) Although she does not challenge this order in relation to 
the two older children, and apparently concedes that some restriction on her 
parenting rights is proper in relation to the youngest, Clayton argues on appeal 
that the district court erred by not allowing supervised contact with her youngest 
child. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-13.) Application of the relevant legal standards to 
the facts of this case shows no abuse of discretion by the district court. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court 
exercises free review over questions of law." Kootenai Medical Center ex rel. 
Teresa K. v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630 
(2009) (citations and quotations omitted). Where, however, findings of fact are 
involved in the due process analysis such findings are reviewed only for clear 
error. State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 788, 979 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 
1999); State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 796, 932 P.2d 907, 919 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. Clayton Has Failed To Show That The District Court Infringed Upon Her 
Due Process Rights In Ordering No Contact With A.O. 
Governmental interference in the right to raise one's child demands due 
process. sLll., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (permanent 
termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing evidence); In 
re Jane Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 536, 164 P.3d 814, 816 (2007) (presumption of 
termination that parent would have to rebut violates Santosky's requirement that 
state prove termination case by clear and convincing evidence); Leavitt v. Leavitt, 
142 Idaho 664, 669-70, 132 P.3d 421, 426-27 (2006) (grandparents seeking 
visitation rights to children against wishes of parents must prove claim by clear 
and convincing evidence). Generally speaking, the government may not interfere 
with the decision of a fit parent who adequately cares for his or her children. 
Troxell v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (plurality) (per four justices with two 
justices concurring in the result). "However, an individual's constitutional rights 
are not absolute; they must be balanced against competing legitimate interests of 
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the state to protect the welfare of its citizens." Wright v. Alexandria Div. of Soc. 
Servs., 433 S.E.2d 500, 505 (Va. App. 1993) (citing Lassiter v. Dep't Soc. Servs. 
Of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)). 
The constitutional test for whether due process has been afforded is 
determined by looking at three factors: the private interest affected by 
government action; the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedure used and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and, 
finally, the governmental interest, including burdens additional process would 
entail. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754-70 (applying test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Ohmer v. Superior Court, 196 Cal.Rptr. 224, 226 (Ca. 
App., 2d Dist, 1983) (applying Eldridge test). 
Clayton was surely afforded due process. She was charged with injury to 
children in a criminal case in which she was afforded a lawyer and chose to 
waive her right to a jury trial, where the state bore the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, by accepting a plea agreement and entering a guilty plea. The 
state afforded all the procedural rights inherent in criminal proceedings-Clayton 
was not entitled to additional due process. 
Clayton first argues that the state had the burden of proving by "clear and 
convincing evidence that Ms. Clayton should not have supervised visitation rights 
with A.O." (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.) This argument is without legal merit. 
Generally speaking, the government may not interfere with the decision of a fit 
parent who adequately cares for his or her children. Troxell v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (plurality) (per four justices with two justices concurring in the 
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result). The burden of showing that a parent is unfit or providing inadequate care 
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Doe 2011-02, 151 
Idaho 356, 256 P.3d 764 (2011) ("The trial court must find that grounds for 
terminating parental rights have been proved by clear and convicting evidence." 
(Emphasis added, internal quotations omitted)); Idaho, Dep't of Health and 
Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 36, _, 244 P.3d 180, 185 (2010) ("Grounds for 
termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing evidence 
... " (emphasis added)). Here the state proved Clayton to be an unfit parent 
providing inadequate care through her guilty plea, which acknowledged her guilt 
of injury to children. Having proved Clayton's unfitness and inadequate care 
beyond a reasonable doubt, Clayton's argument that the state had to meet some 
additional proof by clear and convincing evidence is without merit. 
Second, even if the trial court could order no contact (instead of 
supervised contact) only upon clear and convincing evidence, this Court reviews 
only whether the lower court's decision is supported by substantial, competent 
evidence. In re Doe 2010-28, 151 Idaho 605, _, 261 P.3d 882, 885 (Ct. App. 
2011 ). Clayton's only argument that there was insufficient evidence is that the 
psychological evaluation is "consistent with" supervised visitation. (Appellant's 
brief, p. 12.) This argument fails to even address the proper legal standard, 
much less show a lack of substantial competent evidence supporting the ruling 
that Clayton should not have contact with A.O. 
Clayton next argues that she had a substantive due process right and the 
no contact order was not "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest" 
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because supervised contact will adequately protect A.O. from Clayton. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12.) First, Clayton cites to no cases that indicate she had a 
substantive (as opposed to procedural) right to due process. Her argument 
therefore fails for want of authority. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 
P.2d 966, 970 (1996). A party claiming a right protected by substantive due 
process must carefully identify the right. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 
(1993). Although Clayton had a liberty interest in parenting such that she was 
entitled to procedural due process, Clayton has simply failed to show she had a 
substantive due process right to supervised visitation after she was proved an 
unfit parent. 
Second, even applying the legal standard advocated by Clayton her 
argument fails. This Court rejected a similar argument, in the context of 
procedural due process, in In re Doe 2011-03, _ Idaho_, 260 P.3d 1169 
(2011). There the mother whose parental rights were terminated argued that her 
rights in her youngest child should not have been terminated because "she has 
not been given a chance to demonstrate her ability to provide [the child] the 
necessary parental care." kl, 260 P.3d at 1179. Although the Court recognized 
that it "may be more difficult" for the state to meet its proof of neglect "when the 
child is very young," the state met its burden by presenting evidence showing the 
neglect of the infant in conjunction with the neglect of the infant's siblings. kl 
Likewise in this case, given the abuse heaped on the older children, the evidence 
shows that Clayton need not have been given the chance to further harm her 
youngest child before that child could be protected through the no contact order. 
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The evidence in this case showed that AD., age 7, had been neglected 
and abused and was suffering from academic and social delays in development 
as a result thereof. (PSI, pp. 4-6, 12; Police Report, pp. 16-17.) AD. had shown 
signs of stress after visits with Clayton. (PSI, p. 6; Police Report, pp. 22-23.) 
During visits Clayton acted inappropriately toward A D.-including kissing him on 
the lips and having him hug her by wrapping both his arms and his legs around 
her-to the extent that at least one visit was terminated. (Psychological 
Evaluation, p. 13.) Clayton was not cooperating with the Department of Health 
and Welfare on the reunification plan and the prognosis for reunification was 
"poor." (PSI, p. 12.) The recommendation of the Department of Health and 
Welfare was that parental rights be terminated and all three children adopted. 
(PSI, pp. 12, 17.) 
The psychological evaluator was troubled by Clayton's "distortion of 
reality" in relation to events concerning her children which, he felt, had "serious 
implications for any future parenting." (Psychological Evaluation, p. 15.) He 
concluded her "capacity to parent her children in a healthy, safe and appropriate 
manner is extremely poor" citing her history of abusing her children, her failure to 
take any responsibility for her abusive behavior, the emotional trauma she had 
inflicted on her children, her extravagant neglect of her children's needs, and her 
active attempts to prevent the children from discussing the abuse and neglect 
outside the family. (Psychological Evaluation, p. 16.) The evaluator assessed 
the risk of further abuse and psychological harm of the children should they be 
returned to her care as "extremely high." (Psychological Evaluation, p. 16.) The 
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prognosis of Clayton responding to treatment to change her behaviors was 
"generally poor." (Psychological Evaluation, pp. 16-17.) 
In sentencing the district court concluded that Clayton "demonstrated no 
competency, no skill, no training [and] no aptitude" for raising her children. 
(Sentencing Tr., p. 44, Ls. 14-16.) She had done "just about everything that 
could be done to harm these children, both physically, mentally and all other 
ways that [she] could devise." (Sentencing Tr., p. 44, Ls. 16-20.) Her children 
had "suffered significant delays socially, academically, maturity." (Sentencing 
Tr., p. 44, Ls. 21-23.) The trial judge stated, "I can't imagine the chaos and the 
lack of order and the lack of normalcy for the many years in [Clayton's] 
household during which these activities occurred. And, frankly, it's hard to see 
how [Clayton's] children ever do fully recover from this as they get older and 
integrate more closely into our community and with friends and schools and other 
loved ones." (Sentencing Tr., p. 46, Ls. 9-15.) The court also concluded, based 
on the psychological evaluation, that the children were at "an extremely high risk 
for continued abuse should they have any contact with [Clayton] at all.'' 
(Sentencing Tr., p. 48, Ls. 1-12.) 
Even assuming that there was a substantive due process right involved 
such that it could not be infringed "at alf' unless the infringement is "narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest" (Appellant's brief, p. 12), such 
interest was present here. Clayton was clearly unfit to parent her children, the 
state was apparently in the process of terminating her parental rights, and 
supervised contact with A.O. had in fact proven harmful to him. The district 
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court's order is narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest of protecting A.D. 
against harm. Clayton has shown no error in the district court's no contact order 
or condition of probation. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the no contact order 
and condition of probation. 
DATED this 28th day of Novembe, 2011. 
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